A finance officer receives an email that appears to be from a familiar supplier. The branding is right, the sender name is familiar, and the request is urgent: bank details have changed ahead of a payment run. One approved change can redirect a substantial payment before anyone recognises the fraud.
To reduce phishing risk, organisations need more than annual awareness training and a spam filter. Phishing succeeds where people, processes and technology leave a gap. The most effective approach combines secure email configuration, practical verification processes, role-relevant training and the ability to detect and contain an incident quickly.
Why phishing remains a business resilience problem
Phishing is no longer limited to poorly written messages asking for passwords. Criminal groups research organisations, impersonate executives and suppliers, hijack legitimate email accounts, and use convincing Microsoft 365 sign-in pages to capture credentials. They may then use those credentials to access mailboxes, alter payment instructions, distribute further phishing emails internally, or prepare a ransomware attack.
For Australian organisations, the consequences extend beyond the immediate financial loss. A compromised mailbox can expose client information, commercially sensitive material and personal data. It can also create notification obligations, disrupt operations and damage confidence among customers, partners and regulators.
The right controls depend on the organisation’s risk profile. A council, health provider, professional services firm and logistics business will have different critical systems, users and supplier relationships. However, the underlying principle is consistent: make it difficult for a deceptive message to reach the right person, difficult for a stolen credential to be used, and easy for staff to report suspicious activity.
Reduce phishing risk with layered controls
No single product or policy will stop every phishing attempt. Layered controls provide the resilience that a single point solution cannot. If a malicious email reaches an inbox, strong identity controls may still prevent account takeover. If a user enters credentials, monitoring and rapid response may limit the attacker’s access before material harm occurs.
Secure the email environment first
Email security configuration should be treated as a core control, not a set-and-forget service. Review the protections in Microsoft 365 or the organisation’s email platform against the threats the business actually faces. This includes anti-phishing and anti-malware policies, impersonation protection, attachment and URL scanning, and appropriate quarantine settings.
Domain protection also matters. SPF, DKIM and DMARC help receiving mail systems assess whether messages sent from your domain are legitimate. DMARC in particular gives organisations visibility into unauthorised use of their domain and, once properly configured, enables enforcement policies that reduce successful spoofing. It needs careful implementation, especially where third-party platforms send email on the organisation’s behalf. Moving straight to a restrictive policy without understanding legitimate mail flows can interrupt business communications.
Inbound filtering has limits. Attackers increasingly compromise trusted supplier accounts and use them to send malicious emails from legitimate domains. That is why controls must extend beyond the gateway.
Protect identities, not just inboxes
Phishing is commonly a route to identity compromise. Multi-factor authentication is essential, but its design matters. Basic MFA can still be bypassed through adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits, token theft, push-notification fatigue and session hijacking.
Where supported, organisations should progressively adopt phishing-resistant authentication methods such as FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or certificate-based authentication, particularly for administrators, finance teams, executives and users with access to sensitive systems. Conditional access policies should restrict sign-ins based on risk, device compliance, location and application sensitivity. Legacy authentication protocols that bypass modern controls should be identified and disabled unless there is a documented operational reason to retain them.
Privileged accounts deserve additional protection. Administrative access should be separate from everyday email accounts, protected with stronger authentication, and granted only when required. A phishing incident becomes far more serious when a compromised account can change security settings, create new users or access broad volumes of data.
Build verification into high-risk business processes
Awareness alone asks people to make perfect decisions under pressure. Better process design removes some of that pressure.
Payment changes, payroll amendments, sensitive data requests and urgent executive instructions should have documented out-of-band verification steps. For example, a request to change supplier banking details should be verified by calling a known contact using a number already held in the vendor record, not a number contained in the email. The same principle applies to requests that appear to come from a chief executive, solicitor, insurer or managed service provider.
These controls can feel slower, particularly in teams managing high transaction volumes. The trade-off is justified where a single fraudulent payment could exceed the cost of a verification step many times over. The process should be proportionate: not every routine email needs escalation, but defined high-risk changes should never rely solely on an email instruction.
Make awareness training relevant to real decisions
Generic annual modules tend to produce compliance evidence, not lasting behavioural change. Staff need to recognise the techniques that target their role and understand precisely what to do next.
Finance personnel may need to identify invoice fraud and supplier impersonation. Human resources teams may receive fake job applications or payroll change requests. Technology teams may be targeted with credential-harvesting pages, fake support requests and malicious file-sharing invitations. Executives may face carefully researched messages designed to exploit authority, urgency or confidentiality.
Phishing simulations are useful when they are part of a broader improvement programme. They can establish a baseline, test whether training is translating into safer behaviour and identify groups that need focused support. They should not be used to embarrass people or measure success only by click rates. A mature programme measures positive actions as well, including reporting rates, reporting speed and whether staff use the correct reporting channel.
Short, regular communication works well when it reflects current threats facing the organisation. A timely example of a fake Microsoft 365 prompt or supplier fraud pattern is usually more memorable than a long presentation full of abstract warnings. Leaders should reinforce that reporting a suspicious message is a useful action, even when it turns out to be legitimate.
Prepare for the email that gets through
A credible phishing defence assumes that some messages will bypass controls. What happens in the first hour after a report often determines the impact.
Provide staff with a simple reporting mechanism, ideally integrated into the email client, and ensure reports reach a team that can investigate them promptly. The response process should define who can search for similar messages, remove them from mailboxes, block domains or indicators, reset credentials, revoke active sessions and assess whether sensitive data was accessed.
For suspected business email compromise, preserve evidence and act quickly. Review mailbox forwarding rules, delegated access, OAuth application consents, sign-in activity and recent messages sent from the account. Attackers often create subtle inbox rules to hide payment correspondence or maintain access after a password reset. If payment fraud is suspected, engage the bank and affected counterparties immediately while the transaction may still be recoverable.
The incident response plan should also address decision-making and communications. Technical containment is only one part of the response. Executives, legal advisers, privacy stakeholders, insurers and affected business teams may need to be involved, depending on the data, systems and obligations affected.
Test the controls that matter
Policies and configurations can look sound on paper while failing in practice. Regular assurance gives leaders evidence of whether controls are working as intended and where investment should be prioritised.
A targeted assessment can review email security settings, identity architecture, privileged access, logging, endpoint controls and the processes around financial approvals. Penetration testing and social engineering exercises can validate how an attacker may move from a phishing message to a material business outcome. The scope should be agreed carefully so testing reflects realistic risk without creating unnecessary disruption.
Recognised frameworks can help structure the programme. The Essential Eight provides practical guidance for many Australian organisations, while the CIS Controls, NIST Cybersecurity Framework and NIST 800-53 can support more detailed governance and control alignment. Framework alignment is valuable when it improves decision-making and accountability, not when it becomes a paperwork exercise.
Sentaris works alongside internal business and technology teams to assess exposure, validate existing controls and implement practical improvements. The objective is a defensible, repeatable phishing resilience programme that fits the organisation’s operating environment.
Phishing risk will not disappear, because attackers adapt and business communication must remain open. The practical goal is to ensure one convincing email does not become a payment loss, data breach or operational crisis. Start with the pathways that could cause the greatest harm, test them honestly, and give your people and systems the support to stop an attack before it spreads.